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Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman: Federal Equity Jurisdiction
Restricted by Eleventh Amendment
Immunity
INTRODUCTION

The eleventh amendment' is traditionally viewed as embodying
the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.2 One reason for
the amendment's ratification was to shield states from suit in federal courts. 3 The amendment was also intended to guarantee the
principles of federalism, a concept that encompasses the preservation of state autonomy within the federal system.'
Although the amendment immunizes states from suit in federal
court, it has not provided state officials with the same degree of
immunity. Plaintiffs have been able to avoid a state's eleventh
amendment immunity by suing the state official rather than the
state itself.5 The Supreme Court upheld the validity of such a suit
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The eleventh amendment provides that:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
The eleventh amendment was proposed by Congress on March 4, 1794, and was ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures by January, 1798. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG.
809 (1798); 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 476-77 (1794).
2. See generally Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L.
REV. 139, 140-66 (1977); Jaffe, Suits Against Government and Officers. Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1963); Note, Rethinking Sovereign 1mmunity After Bivens,
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 604-21 (1982) for discussions of sovereign immunity. See also
infra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
A full discussion of federalism is beyond the scope of this note. For further discussion,
see Bartow, SafeguardingFederalism-ChangingConceptions of the JudicialRole: From
NLC to EEOC and Beyond, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 889 (1982); Cox, Federalism and Individual
Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1978); Durchslag, Federalism and
ConstitutionalLiberties: Varying the Remedy to Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 723
(1979); Weinberg, The New JudicialFederalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191 (1977); Comment, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133
(1977).
5. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204
(1897); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885). See generally C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 106-48 (1972).
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in Ex parte Young.6 In Young, the Court acknowledged that a suit
challenging the constitutionality of a state official's conduct is not
one against the state, because the state is not the real party in interest. 7 As a result of this decision, the eleventh amendment has not
been viewed as a shield against suits alleging constitutional violations by state officials.
The Supreme Court's most recent examination of the application
of eleventh amendment immunity to state officials was in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman (PennhurstII).8 In
this decision, the Court addressed the issue of whether federal injunctive relief could be granted against state officials based upon
violation of state law.9 This was a significant area of inquiry because suits in which eleventh amendment immunity has been asserted as a defense generally have sought to enjoin on the basis of
federal, rather than state, law grounds.' 0 In Pennhurst II, a divided Court held that the eleventh amendment limits injunctive
relief by prohibiting a federal court from ordering state officials to
comply with state law." In so holding, the Pennhurst II Court
expanded the concept of state immunity by prohibiting federal
courts from commanding state officials to conform their conduct to
state law.' 2 Furthermore, the Court significantly restricted the judicial doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, which allows a federal court
to adjudicate related claims over which it would otherwise not
have jurisdiction.' 3
6. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
7. Young, 209 U.S. at 159.
8. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). This was the Supreme Court's second opinion in the Pennhurst litigation and will be referred to throughout this note as "PennhurstH." In the first
decision, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) ("Pennhurst
"), the Court held that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) did not create any substantive rights. 451
U.S. at 27-31.
9. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 908-911. See infra notes 116-46 and accompanying
text.
10. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 155 (1978) (alleged unconstitutionality of state law); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 653 (1973) (alleged violation
of various federal regulations and the fourteenth amendment); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 144-45 (1908) (alleged violation of due process and equal protection clauses of fourteenth amendment); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 467 (1898) (alleged violation of fourteenth amendment); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894)
(alleged violation of fourteenth amendment). See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying
text for discussion of Ex parte Young, and infra notes 57-59 for discussion of Edelman v.
Jordan.
11. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 911.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 917-19. See infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine.
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This note examines the constitutional and jurisdictional dimensions of Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman. It first
briefly reviews the history of the eleventh amendment and the
Supreme Court's various interpretations of it. Next, the note discusses the PennhurstII majority and dissenting opinions, addressing the critical distinctions between the majority and dissent
analyses. Further, it examines whether the Court's holding actually fulfills the goal of promoting federalism, which was an underlying concern of the majority opinion. Finally, this note will
explore the effects of the decision upon future litigation, emphasizing the choices plaintiffs will face in pursuing lawsuits against state
officials.
BACKGROUND

The Eleventh Amendment
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity provides that a sovereign may not be sued without its consent. 14 Sovereign immunity is
a limit upon the judicial authority conferred by Article III of the
Constitution.' 5 In Chisholm v. Georgia,'6 decided under Article
14. See supra note 2. Sovereign immunity was fully developed in England before the
American Revolution. See Jaffe, supra note 2, at 2. The sovereign immunity doctrine
was based upon the nature of kingship under English law. Although the ruler was under
the law, he was not subject to the processes of the courts that he had created. Therefore,
the king could not be prosecuted unless he consented. See JACOBS, supra note 5, at 15152; Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation,2 GA. L. REV. 207,
211-14 (1968).
The independent American states adopted the sovereign immunity principle, along
with the remainder of English law. See Mathis, supra, at 210. The American states
exercised sovereignty and were immune from suit in their own courts, which were the
only courts in existence in the United States prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
But see Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1896-99 (1983).
15. See Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 907. The Court quoted Ex parte State of New
York No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) for the proposition that the "judicial power granted
by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private
parties against a State without consent given .... "
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 provides as follows:
The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party;-to
Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of
another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.
16. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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III, the Supreme Court answered for the first time the question of
whether a state could be sued by an individual in federal court.
The Chisholm Court held that a federal suit could be brought
against the state of Georgia by two residents of South Carolina
who were seeking to collect a debt owed to them by that state.' 7 In
response to the Chisholm decision, Congress proposed the eleventh
amendment. I
The eleventh amendment provides that a state may not be sued
in federal court by a citizen of another state or by a foreign citizen.' 9 The states ratified the amendment in order to prevent the
collection of state debts20 and to uphold the principle of sovereign
immunity.2
Whether sovereign immunity is a constitutional doctrine or
merely a judge-made doctrine has been the subject of academic and
judicial debate. Although legal scholars agree that a common law
sovereign immunity existed prior to the ratification of the Constitution, there are various interpretations concerning the effect of the
eleventh amendment on sovereign immunity. One view is that the
17. Id. at 465-66.
18. See JACOBS, supra note 5, at 65.
19. See supra note 1. For general background on the development of the eleventh
amendment, see JACOBS, supra note 5; Baker, supra note 2, at 140-66; Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines. Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515
(1978); Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of JurisdictionRather Than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1038-63 (1983).

An eleventh amendment immunity defense may be raised at any level of judicial proceedings. As indicated by the Court in Ford Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467
(1945), "[t]he Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue
arising under this Amendment in this case even though urged for the first time in this
Court."
20. The states feared that federal courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary
War debts, leading to financial ruin. See Baker, supra note 2, at 140; Mathis, supra note
14, at 212; Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Litigation, Taxation and Regulation:
Separation of Powers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89 HAR. L. REV. 682,
683 (1975).
For a general discussion of the political context in which the eleventh amendment was
ratified, see JACOBS, supra note 5, at 41-75; Gibbons, supra note 14, at 1895-1914.
21. See Mathis, supra note 14, at 212-14. Federalist supporters of the Constitution,
including Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall, maintained that the
creation of a federal judiciary would not impair the states' sovereign immunity.
As Chief Justice, however, Marshall espoused a narrower view of the eleventh amendment's scope, maintaining that it prohibited only suits commenced or prosecuted against
a state by citizens of other states or by aliens. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 407 (1821). See generally Note, A PracticalView of the Eleventh Amendment-Lower Court Interpretationand the Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 GEO. L.J. 1473
(1973).
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eleventh amendment did not impose any immunity of constitutional dimension, but merely reversed the Chisholm Court's holding that Article III, section 2 abrogated existing common law
immunity.22 A second interpretation is that the amendment
merely affirmed the inherent sovereign immunity of the states, by
reversing the Court's incorrect interpretation set forth in Chisholm
and restoring the "original understanding"23 that the Constitution
did not authorize suits against states to be brought in federal forums.24 Under a third view, the amendment restored and constitutionally mandated the states' immunity, which had been nullified
by Article III, section 2.25

Early Supreme Court decisions grappled with the various interpretations of the eleventh amendment. The Court limited the
scope of the amendment in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 where it held that
the amendment did not bar Supreme Court review of state court
judgments in suits against states involving federal questions. Three
years later, in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 7 Chief Justice
Marshall placed two further limitations on the amendment's protection. The Osborn Court determined that unless the state was a
party of record, the suit was not one against a state. Furthermore,
when a state officer is acting under a law that is unconstitutional,
the state's immunity from suit does not protect an official when he
is executing provisions of that state law.2 s Thus, the Osborn decision offered potential for establishing federal judicial control over
state officers, which would result in federal control over state action allegedly violative of individual rights.2 9 Nonetheless, the Osborn doctrine remained undisturbed and unused for half a
22. See Comment, Eleventh Amendment Immunity and State-Owned Vessels, 57 TUL.
L. REV. 1523, 1524 n.2 (1983). One theory is that because the amendment restored the
notion that the Constitution neither incorporated nor abrogated the states' immunity,
common law immunity remained as a judicial doctrine which could be abrogated or modified by either statute or judicial decision. See generally Field, supra note 19, at 545.
23. In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890), the Court stated that the Chisholm
decision created a "shock of surprise throughout the country" by departing from an original understanding that the states would be immune from suit without their consent.
24. See Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health & Welfare Dep't., 411 U.S. 279, 291-92
(1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1890)).
But see Gibbons, supra note 14, at 1936.
25. See Comment, supra note 22, at 1525-26 n.2.
26. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
27. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
28. Id. at 857; 836-37. Osborn is also noted for the proposition that when a federal
question forms part of a cause of action, the circuit courts have jurisdiction over that
cause, even if other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it. See C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §

29.

See

JACOBS,

supra note 5, at 106.

19 (4th ed. 1983).
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century.°

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a revival of judicial interest in the eleventh amendment. 3' The Court
established the principle that a state may waive its immunity and
submit to suit in federal court.3 2 The Court also held states to be
amenable to suit by sister states33 and by the United States,34 based
on the theory that the states acquiesced to the constitutional plan
when they joined the Union.35 The amendment was given a
broader reach in Hans v. Louisiana, where the Court held that a
state cannot be sued by one of its own citizens in federal court,
even though the amendment does not expressly provide this.36 The
amendment's scope was further expanded by the Court's prohibition of suits by foreign nations against states.37 However, the
amendment was held to be inapplicable to suits instituted against
political subdivisions of a state.3"
30. Id.
31. Id. Jacobs offers several reasons for the reawakened interest in the eleventh
amendment. Pressures for expeditious federal judicial remedies resulted from grievances
arising from post-Reconstruction repudiation of debts by some southern states, and from
beginning attempts by the states to regulate business enterprise. See also Gibbons, supra
note 14, at 1971 (a major factor leading to reconsideration of the eleventh amendment
was the southern governments' repudiation of bonds issued by their predecessors).
Although most of the Court's eleventh amendment decisions during this period involved suits against state officers, the Court also interpreted other aspects of the amendment. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 20 (1933); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). Cf Smith v.
Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
See generally Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 17 GA. L. REV.
513 (1983) for a discussion of waiver. See also infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315-21 (1904).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
35. See Note, Reconciling Federalism and Individual Rights: The Burger Court's
Treatment of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 68 VA. L. REV. 865, 869 (1982).
36. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In Hans, the Court rejected the position that a state could be
sued in federal court by its own citizens under the federal question clause of Article III.
37. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). The Monaco Court reached this
result even though the amendment does not expressly prohibit such suits and Article III,
section 2 of the Constitution explicitly grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction over suits
between a state and foreign states.
38. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). The Luning Court determined that while a county is territorially part of a state, politically it is a corporation
created by the state. In this respect, it is part of the state "only in that remote sense in
which any city, town or other municipal corporation may be said to be part of the
[s]tate." Id. at 530.
For discussion of immunity of county officials in modern times, see infra note 144 and
accompanying text.
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Suits Against Officers
During this period of revived interest in the eleventh amendment, the Court decided a number of suits against state and federal
officials.3 9 In some cases, the Court narrowly interpreted the eleventh amendment and allowed a remedy against public officers who
acted as agents of the state. 4' However, in a series of decisions
involving efforts by individuals to force states either to pay interest
on state bonds4 ' or to accept bond coupons in lieu of payment of
state taxes, 42 the Court found that the eleventh amendment barred
recovery. For example, in In re Ayers,43 the Court concluded that
a suit by coupon holders against state officers for breach of a state's
contract should be deemed a suit against the state itself.44
The principle that state officials can be enjoined by a federal
39. See infra notes 40-62 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897) (suit by citizens of New York
against two citizens of South Carolina, including the secretary of state of South Carolina,
to recover possession of real property held not to be a suit against the state within the
meaning of the eleventh amendment); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1873)
(Court held that a circuit court may enjoin a state officer from carrying out a state law
which conflicts with the Constitution or a federal statute).
With the advent of the railroad rate cases, eleventh amendment interpretation underwent a new phase, beginning in the late nineteenth century. See JACOBS, supra note 5, at
132. This period witnessed a significant decrease in the successful use of the eleventh
amendment as a defense in federal suits brought against state officers. In Reagan v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894), the Court upheld a circuit court order
enjoining the Texas attorney general and members of the state railroad commission from
recovering penalties for rate violations. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
decree, reasoning that the challenged injunction was sustainable under the principle that
a state officer may be sued in law or equity for wrongs committed under color of unconstitutional authority. Id. at 413. See also Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). But see
Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899) (Court reversed a lower court order enjoining the
Alabama Attorney General and other law officers from instituting proceedings to enforce
an allegedly unconstitutional state statute).
41. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Macon R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883) (Court determined
that the requested relief would necessarily operate against the state as such and not
merely against its officers in their personal capacities); New Hampshire v. Louisiana &
New York v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (where citizens of New Hampshire and New
York owned bonds of the State of Louisiana, and were precluded from bringing suit by
the eleventh amendment, Court found that neither New Hampshire nor New York could
allow the use of its name in such a suit for the benefit of one of its citizens); Louisiana ex
rel. Elliot v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 728 (1883) (remedy sought would require the Court to
assume all of the state's executive authority in relation to the law in question).
42. See, e.g., Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1896) (a judgment against officers
commanding them to perform official functions on behalf of the state, is a judgment
against the state itself); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887). But see Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885) (a state officer who relies upon an unconstitutional law is
stripped of his official character, and his wrong is a personal one for which he is
answerable).
43. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
44. Id. at 502-03.
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court from enforcing an unconstitutional state statute was reaffirmed in the seminal eleventh amendment decision of Ex parte
Young.4 5 In Young, railroad company stockholders sought to enjoin the Minnesota Attorney General from enforcing a state statute
lowering railroad rates. The plaintiffs alleged that the regulation
violated the fourteenth amendment.46 The Court ruled that a state
official could be sued for injunctive relief when he has acted in an
unconstitutional manner. This decision was based upon the rationale that such conduct strips the officer of his authority to act for
the state and thus eliminates the sovereign's immunity.47 In deciding Young, the Court regarded the officer's action as state action in
order to invoke the fourteenth amendment, yet simultaneously
considered such conduct to be individual action in order to avoid
eleventh amendment immunity.48 Despite this inconsistency,
Young established a retreat from an expansive interpretation of the
eleventh amendment.49
45.

209 U.S. 123 (1908). Ex parte Young has been referred to as one of the Supreme

Court's three most important decisions. 17 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4231 (1978). For a discussion of Young, see generally JACOBS,

supra note 5, at 138-42, 144-47; Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus W. Peckham and the Case of
Ex Parte Young: Lochnerizing Munn v. Illinois, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 539.
Young built on the constitutional doctrine which had been established in Reagan v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894). See supra note 40 for discussion of
Reagan.
46. Young, 209 U.S. at 130.
47. Id. at 159-60.
48. See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982).
According to Professor Jacobs:
The doctrinal development wrought by Young reflected the sympathetic preoccupation of the federal judiciary with the substantive rights secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court never quite sanctioned the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment superceded [sic] the Eleventh Amendment
insofar as the two might conflict, it liberalized the principles governing suits
against state officers in such a way that the substantive rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment were accorded much broader federal judicial protection than were those asserted under the contract clause ....
JACOBS, supra note 5, at 142-43.
49. See JACOBS, supra note 5, at 142-46. Professor Jacobs notes that suits against
state officers increased significantly after the Young decision. After Young, many federal
judges began to grant interlocutory injunctions on the strength of affidavits alone, or to
grant temporary restraining orders ex parte. Congress responded by enacting the ThreeJudge Court Act, Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557, which prohibited a
single federal judge from issuing interlocutory injunctions restraining the enforcement of
allegedly unconstitutional state statutes. The statute instead required that these cases be
heard by a district court composed of three judges. The statute's rationale was that three
judges would be less likely to exercise federal injunctive power imprudently. The ThreeJudge Court Act was modified by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, P.L. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119
(1976). Sections 2281 and 2282 of the United States Code, which required that an application for such an injunction be heard and determined by three judges, was repealed in
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The question of whether a suit against an officer is in fact one
against the state was also addressed by the Court within the context of lawsuits involving torts. Several decisions upheld suits
against state officers on the grounds that such suits compelled the
performance of a plain ministerial, rather than a discretionary,
duty,50 or that they redressed personal wrongs committed by officers with official but legally deficient authorization. 51 Years later,
in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,S2 the Court held
that if the actions of an officer do not conflict with his statutory
authority, they should be regarded as the actions of the sovereign
under the rules of agency.53 At the same time, the Larson Court
acknowledged the principle that if an official has engaged in conduct which the sovereign has not authorized, or in behavior which
4 and he is
the sovereign has forbidden, his actions are ultra vires"55
precluded from using an eleventh amendment defense.
Although courts have engaged in various analyses to avoid the
restrictions of the eleventh amendment, recent cases demonstrate
that the basic underlying premise of sovereign immunity remains a
powerful force.56 In Edelman v. Jordan,5" for example, the Court
held that when a plaintiff alleging a violation of federal law seeks
order to relieve the burden of the three-judge court cases, to remove procedural uncertainties existing under the three-judge courts, and because case law had provided safeguards against imprudent injunctive action by federal judges. See S. REP. No. 204, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1988; see also C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 45, at § 4234.
50. See, e.g., Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390, 411 (1887) (Court
held that the suit was brought to compel a state officer to do what a state statute required
him to do, and thus was not a suit against the state but against the officer).
51. See, e.g., Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897) (suit to recover possession of real
property held not to be a suit against the state); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1
(1891) (suit brought against a state board of land commissioners, in order to restrain the
defendants from doing acts allegedly violative of plaintiff's contract with the state, was
not a suit against the state within the meaning of the eleventh amendment). Cf Hopkins
v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636, 643 (1911) (eleventh amendment immunity does not protect a state officer who, under color of his office, has injured a citizen).
52. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
53. Id. at 695. Larson thus established that an error of law by state officers acting in
their official capacity did not override state immunity.
54. The phrase "ultra vires" refers to acts which are in excess of powers granted. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (5th ed. 1979). For further discussion of the ultra vires
principle, see infra notes 132-35 and 156-61 and accompanying text.
55. Larson, 337 U.S. at 689.
56. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (Court held that 42 U.S.C. section
1983 did not attempt to override the states' eleventh amendment immunity).
57. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Edelman involved a class action suit seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief against the Illinois officials administering the federal-state programs of
Aid to the Aged, Blind & Disabled. The plaintiffs alleged a violation of federal law and a
denial of equal protection.
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relief against a state official, the federal court may enjoin the officer's future conduct, but cannot award retroactive monetary relief. 8 The Court declined to extend the Young principle to
retroactive damage awards, reasoning that to do so would eliminate the states' constitutional immunity. 9
The Court has recently interpreted the eleventh amendment as
not barring an in rem action in admiralty against state officials for
possession of artifacts salvaged from a shipwreck. 6° In another case
decided the same term, 6 ' the Court held that an attempt by the
administrator of an estate to bring an interpleader action against
officials of California and Texas was barred by the amendment's
prohibition of federal suits "against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State." 62
The Eleventh Amendment and Federalism
The concept of federalism plays an important role in any litigation involving eleventh amendment immunity.63 Federalism is a
constitutional concept signifying a system of government which
balances both federal power and state autonomy concerns.' One
of the objectives in the states' ratification of the eleventh amendment was to guarantee federalism principles. 65 The amendment
was designed to prevent the federal government, through its
courts, from interfering in state governmental functions.66 The
major values of federalism implicated by the eleventh amendment
include federal recognition of state immunity and the protection of
58. Id. at 677,
59. Id. at 666. The Court reasoned that an award of restitution would have to be
paid from state funds, rather than from the pockets of the officers named as defendants.
Id. at 677.
60. Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 699 (1982). Justice
White, concurring and dissenting in part, maintained that the suit was one against the
state, since it was to determine the title of the State of Florida to the artifacts. 458 U.S. at
706 (White, J., concurring and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
and O'Connor). However, in the opinion, Justice White also recognized the principle
that where an officer's actions are limited by statute, actions which go beyond those limitations should be considered individual, and not sovereign, actions. Id. at 714 (White, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part).
61. Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982).
62. Id. at 91. The Court reaffirmed that the eleventh amendment does not bar suits
against state officers when they are "alleged to be acting against federal or state law." Id.
63. See Note, supra note 32, at 520-37 and supra note 4 and accompanying text.
64. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-39 (1978).
65. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
66. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490,
497-98 (1921).
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a state's treasury. 67 Federalism principles typify the eleventh
amendment concern with preventing undue tension between state
autonomy and national authority.68
The Young doctrine 69 established a new view of the federal
courts as principal protectors of federal rights.' 0 Subsequent to
Young, various statutes and judicial doctrines have been created
which serve to protect state autonomy from federal court intervention." For example, federal courts may enjoin the collection of
state taxes only if the state court remedies are not "plain, speedy,
and efficient."' 2 Additionally, the abstention doctrine expressly
promotes federalism values by establishing circumstances under
which a federal court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction. 3
In a relatively recent series of cases dealing with questions of
67. See Note, supra note 35, at 866 n.4; see generally, Baker, supra note 2.
68. See Baker, supra note 2, at 173.
69. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
70. See Baker, supra note 2, at 158.
71. Id. at 173. See also infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). Similar restrictions apply to injunctions directed
toward state rate-making bodies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982) which provides:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain the operation of, or
compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and
made by a State administrative agency or a rate-making body of a State political
subdivision, where:
(1) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of
the order to the Federal Constitution; and
(2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and,
(3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearing; and
(4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
State.
73. See Baker, supra note 2, at 174.
Abstention is a response to the problems caused by the existence of two sets of courts,
federal and state, which have authority to adjudicate questions of federal and state law.
See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1676 (10th ed.
1980). The best-established of the abstention doctrines is Pullman-type abstention,
named after the case of Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
In Pullman, the Court established the doctrine that a federal court may, and ordinarily
should, refrain from deciding a case which challenges state action as contrary to the
federal Constitution, if unsettled questions of state law might be dispositive of the case
and avoid decision of the constitutional question. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
45, at § 4242. See also Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (district court should
refuse jurisdiction when a case presents complex questions of state law, especially when
the state law reflects an important state policy); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (a
federal injunction can run against a pending state criminal prosecution only on a "showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief," and that an injunction is proper only to prevent immediate irreparable injury
which cannot be alleviated by defense to a single criminal prosecution).
For a general discussion of the various abstention doctrines, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 99-109 (2d ed. 1983); Field, Abstention in

ConstitutionalCases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
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federalism, the Court has addressed attempts to sue a state based
on the theory that the state has waived its immunity from suit in
federal court. In Parden v. Terminal Railway,74 the Court concluded that in the absence of express language to the contrary,
Congress intended that a state-owned railroad could be sued in federal court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.75 However,
76
in Employees v. Missouri Public Health and Welfare Department
the Court determined that the Fair Labor Standards Act 77 lacked a
precise expression of congressional intent to override the states' immunity, and held that the suit was barred by the eleventh amendment. 7 Moreover, in Edelman v. Jordan,7 9 the Court was unable
to find congressional intent to authorize suit against the state, because the Social Security Act that established the program did not
provide for a private cause of action. 0 These cases suggest that the
Court will permit an eleventh amendment defense against private
damage suits when it is not satisfied that Congress has carefully
considered the states' interests."s Therefore, concepts of federalism
apparently will continue to be important elements of judicial analysis in these situations.
Pendent Jurisdiction
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction provides that when a federal court has jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate a
related state law claim over which it would not otherwise have had
jurisdiction. 82 Pendent jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine,
derived from the general "cases and controversies" language of Ar1071 (1974); L. TRIBE, supra note 64, at § 3-40; C. WRIGHT, supra note 28, at §§ 52,
52A.
74. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
75. Id. at 190. The Parden Court rejected Alabama's eleventh amendment defense,
finding that the states had surrendered a portion of their sovereignty by granting Congress the power to regulate commerce, and that the FELA was a legitimate exercise of
that power. Id. at 191-92. Parden established that Congress may condition state involvement in a federally regulated activity upon the state's waiver of its eleventh amendment
immunity.
76. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
78. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285.
79. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
80. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673-74.
81. See Note, supra note 35, at 873.
82. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). See generally 13
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567 (1975); Note,
The Evolution and Scope of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 1018 (1962); Note, Pendent Jurisdiction: An Expanding Concept in Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 51 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1965).
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ticle III.3 The Supreme Court laid the groundwork for the principle of pendent jurisdiction in an early decision, Osborn v. Bank of
the United States. 4 In Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall observed
that a circuit court had jurisdiction over a question arising under
the Constitution, even though other questions of fact or law may
have been involved in its determination. 5
This concept was expanded in Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co. 16 In Siler, a state order regulating rates was attacked
as unauthorized by state law and as unconstitutional under federal
law. Avoiding the constitutional issue, the Court held the state
regulation invalid on state grounds, rather than on federal constitutional grounds.8 7 In so ruling, the Court declared that a decision
based on state law was preferable to an unnecessary determination
of federal constitutional issues.R
Judicial debate over the extent to which jurisdiction of a federal
element in a case carried with it pendent jurisdiction over other
elements was resolved by the Supreme Court in United Mine
Workers of America v. Gibbs. 9 In Gibbs, the plaintiff brought suit
in federal court, seeking recovery under section 303 of the Labor
Management Relations Act 90 and the common law of Tennessee.
The Gibbs Court concluded that the district court had properly
entertained jurisdiction of the state law claim. 9' The Court formulated a two-step approach for pendent jurisdiction. First, consideration must be given to the power of the court to hear the pendent
claim. 92 Then, if the court has that power, there must be consider83. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 919 (1984).
See also supra note 15 for the text of Article III, § 2, cl. 1.
84. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Osborn.
85. Id. at 823.
86. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
87. Id. at 194.
88. Id. at 193.
89. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The Court's initial attempt at clarification had measured the
scope of federal jurisdiction in terms of the concept of "cause of action." Hum v. Ousler,
289 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1933). According to this view, if a plaintiff presented two distinct
grounds in support of a single cause of action, the federal court had jurisdiction of the
entire claim, yet if the assertions amounted to two separate and distinct causes of action,
there was jurisdiction only over the federal cause of action. See C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 82, at § 3567.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982)).
91. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 729.
92. Id. at 725-26. The Court indicated that:
The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a
plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in
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whether the court in its discretion ought to exercise that
ation of
93
power.

The Gibbs test has resulted in an expansive use of pendent jurisdiction. 94 Considerable debate has developed over the extent to
which the pendent jurisdiction doctrine should be utilized. One
view is that pendent jurisdiction enables a plaintiff with state and
federal claims to use the federal courts, thus providing a true
choice of forums.9" Other commentators have called for a less active judicial policy, recommending that pendent jurisdiction be restricted. 96 The subject of pendent jurisdiction was one of the issues
addressed by the Court in Pennhurst II.
DISCUSSION

Pennhurst I
In 1974, respondent Terri Lee Halderman was a minor resident
of Pennhurst State School and Hospital. 9 Pennhurst was a large
institution owned and operated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. At the time the suit was filed, the institution housed approximately 1,200 residents, of whom seventy-five percent were
either severely or profoundly retarded; many of the residents were
also physically handicapped. 98
Halderman filed suit in 1974 alleging violations of federal constitutional and statutory law, as well as state law. 99 The defendants
one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there
is power in federal courts to hear the whole.
Id. at 725.
93. Id. at 725-26. In terms of the exercise of judicial discretion, the Court determined
that trial courts should consider factors such as judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants, and should avoid unnecessary decisions of state law. Id. at 726.
94. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 82, at § 3567.
95. See Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts: A Revised Rationalefor Pendent Jurisdiction, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 245, 256 (1980). Schenkier maintains that compelling a plaintiff to use the state courts when he seeks to join state and federal claims
frustrates the congressional goal of providing plaintiffs with a true choice of forums. By
allowing joinder of such claims within a court's Article III power, pendent jurisdiction
removes the barriers that discourage plaintiffs from bringing their federal claims to federal court.
96. See, e.g., Note, The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 YALE L.J. 627, 654 (1978) (federal courts' jurisdiction must be
determined not only by considerations of efficiency but also by the relationship of states
to nation; a more limited test for pendent jurisdiction would commit federal courts to
their proper constitutional role). See also Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdictionof the
Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968).
97. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 6 (1981).
98. Id.
99. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
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were Pennhurst and various Pennhurst officials, the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare and several of its officials, and various county officials." °
The district court held that the dangerous and inadequate conditions at Pennhurst violated each resident's rights under the eighth
and fourteenth amendments, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act (the MH/MR Act).' 0 ' The court found that when a state
undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in
the least restrictive setting consistent with that person's needs. 0 2
After concluding that Pennhurst's large size prevented it from doing so, the court ordered that "immediate steps be taken to remove
the retarded residents from Pennhurst.' 10 3 The defendants were
ordered to provide suitable living arrangements for the class
members. 104
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, in large part, the judgment of the trial court. 05 The court found that the federal Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act contained a
clear expression requiring rehabilitation in the least restrictive setting. 10 6 Furthermore, the court rejected the appellants' assertion
1977). The plaintiffs' amended complaint sought damages and injunctive relief, alleging
that conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, amended by, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081
(1976 & Supp. V 1981); and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation
Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1982). 446 F.
Supp. at 1298 & nn.l-3.
Ultimately, the plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons who were or who
might become residents of Pennhurst, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens, and the United States. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S.Ct.
900, 903-04 (1984).
100. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. at 1301-02.
101. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1321, 1323
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
102. Id. at 1319.
103. Id. at 1325.
104. Id. at 1326. The court also appointed a special master to plan and supervise the
implementation of the order. Id. The court further determined that the individual defendants had acted in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. Id.
at 1324.
105. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en
banc).
106. Id. at 95-100, 104-07. The court did not consider the eighth or fourteenth
amendment issues or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, cited supra at note 99. The
court affirmed the district court's holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate habilitation. 612 F.2d at 100-03.
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that the eleventh amendment barred the trial court's decree. "0
In its first Pennhurst opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals and concluded that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act did not create
any substantive rights."os The Court then remanded the case for a
determination of whether a remedial order could be supported on
the basis of state law, the Constitution, or the federal Rehabilitation Act. 19
On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in
its entirety, basing its decision on state law. 0 The court unanimously rejected the petitioners' argument that the eleventh amendment barred federal court adjudication of the state law claim."'
Noting that the Siler case had involved state officials as defendants," 2' the Third Circuit held that there was no eleventh amend-3
ment exception to the rule of pendent jurisdiction."1
Subsequently, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari" 4 to
consider the question whether a federal court may award injunctive relief on state law grounds against state officials.'
The Supreme Court Decision in Pennhurst II
In a five-four decision," 6 the Court again reversed the Third Cir107. Pennhurst, 612 F.2d at 109.
108. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
109. Id. at 31.
110. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 661 (3d Cir. 1982)
(en banc). The court found that a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981), had held that the MH/MR Act required the
state to adopt the "least restrictive environment" approach in the care of the mentally
retarded. 673 F.2d at 651-53.
In addition to concluding that the Pennsylvania MH/MR Act fully supported its prior
judgment, the court reiterated its prior holding that the part of the order directing the
closing of Pennhurst and the barring of future admissions went beyond the requirements
of the fourteenth amendment, the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 673 F.2d at 660. See supra note 99.
111. Id. at 659. The court held that the eleventh amendment did not bar the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction over a state law claim under the MH/MR Act. Id. Although
Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Hunter dissented in part regarding the authorization of the
special master, they agreed with the majority that the eleventh amendment did not foreclose the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims. Id. at 662 (Seitz, J.,
and Hunter, J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Garth, dissenting as to the relief ordered, also
concurred with the majority's rejection of the defendants' eleventh amendment defense.
Id. at 663 (Garth, J., dissenting).
112. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
113. Pennhurst, 673 F.2d at 657, 658.
114. 457 U.S. 1131 (1982).
115. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
116. Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the five member majority. Justice Stevens
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cuit, this time holding that the eleventh amendment prohibited the
federal district court from ordering the state officials to conform
their conduct to state law, since the state was the real party in
interest." 7 The Court further held that the amendment barred the
state law claims from being brought into court under pendent
jurisdiction."'
The Court began its analysis by observing that the principle of
sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Article III of the Constitution." 9 The
Court recognized the general rule that relief sought against a state
official is, in effect, a suit against the state if the state is the real
party in interest. 20 Referring to the important exception established in Ex parte Young,' 2' the Court also noted that a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state officer's conduct is not one
against the state, because an official who acts unconstitutionally is
"stripped of his official or representative character."'' 22 The Court
cautioned, however, that the Young exception has not been liberally applied.' 23 It pointed to its earlier decision in Edelman v. Jordissented and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice Brennan
also authored a brief separate dissent.
117. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S.Ct. 900, 911 (1984).
118. 104 S. Ct. at 919.
To date, the Pennhurst II rationale has been addressed by five courts of appeal. See,
e.g., McGruder v. Necaise, No. 83-4570 (5th Cir. June 8, 1984) (cited Pennhurst II for
proposition that eleventh amendment and the related doctrine of sovereign immunity
have not outlived their usefulness); Rivera v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Social Serv., No. 831648 (1st Cir. May 31, 1984) (cited Pennhurst 1H for proposition that "even where a
substantial constitutional claim has been pleaded, a federal court may not award either
prospective or retroactive relief against state officers exclusively on the basis of state
law"); Almendral v. New York State Office of Mental Health, No. 83-7762 (2d Cir. May
11, 1984) (concluded that Pennhurst II warranted dismissal of the pendent state claims);
Bushey v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm., 733 F.2d 220, 223 n.4 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Pennhurst H1 foreclosed court from considering plaintiffs' state law claim); Allegheny
County Sanitary Auth. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 732 F.2d 1167, 1174 (3d Cir.
1984) (found no basis in the record for finding that the state officials acted ultra vires);
Shaffer v. Bd. of School Directors of the Albert Gallatin Area School Dist., 730 F.2d 910,
912 n. I (3d Cir. 1984) (noted that the Pennhurst II Court had emphasized the reluctance
of federal courts to decide important and unclear issues of state law under principles of
pendent jurisdiction). Cf.Miami Univ. Associated Student Gov't v. Shriver, 735 F.2d
201, 204 (6th Cir. 1984) (court acknowledged Pennhurst HI holding but indicated that
ultra vires challenge could be sustained if officials acted without any authority whatever).
119. Pennhurst 11, 104 S.Ct. at 907.
120. Id. at 908 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464
(1945)).
121. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text for discussion of Young.
122. Id. at 909 (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)).
123. Young, 209 U.S. at 909.
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dan,' 2 4 which had emphasized that the need to insure the
supremacy of federal law must be reconciled with the constitutional immunity of the states.'25
A major theme underlying the Court's opinion was that a federal
court order to a state official, which is based on state law, directly
conflicts with the principles of federalism underlying the eleventh
amendment. 2 6 The Court emphasized that it had previously refused to award retroactive damages against a state, because this
27
would effectively eliminate the state's constitutional immunity.
This refusal to award retroactive damages, while still allowing the
possibility of prospective relief, strikes a balance between the
Young principle and the concept of state sovereignty. 21 In the
present case, according to the Court, the fundamental federal interests at stake in Young were absent, since the plaintiffs had only
alleged that state officials had violated state law. 1 29 Therefore, the
PennhurstH majority refused to apply the Young principle to violations of state, as well as federal, law. 130 As Justice Powell noted,
it was "difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty
than when a federal court instructs
state officials on how to con' 3
form their conduct to state law."' '
The majority also challenged the continued validity of the ultra
vires doctrine in the eleventh amendment context, as set forth in
the dissenting opinion. 32 The Court read Larson133 to mean that
an error of law by state officers acting in their official capacities will
not suffice to override the state's sovereign immunity. 34 Even assuming the continued validity of the ultra vires doctrine, the ma124. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). For a discussion of Edelman, see supra text accompanying
notes 57-59.
125. Pennhurst HI, 104 S.Ct. at 910-11.
126. See Pennhurst I, 104 S. Ct. at 911.
127. Id. The Court relied on Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974), in which
the Court determined that the district court's retroactive award of monetary relief was, in
practical effect, indistinguishable from an award of damages against the state, and would
be paid from state funds rather than from the pockets of the individual state officials who
were the defendants.
128. Pennhurst H, 104 S.Ct. at 911.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 914 & n.22. The majority maintained that Justice Stevens' view that an
allegation of a violation of a state statute suffices to override the state's eleventh amendment immunity "rests on fiction, is wrong on the law, and, most important, would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 911.
133. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). See
supra text accompanying notes 52-55 for a discussion of Larson.
134. Pennhurst II, 104 S.Ct. at 915. The Court stressed that policy reasons pre-
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jority maintained that the MH/MR Act gave the petitioners broad
discretion to provide "adequate" mental health services, and their
35
conduct, therefore, was within their delegated authority.1
The Court next addressed the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the eleventh amendment. The Court indicated that
it had long recognized and applied the principles of pendent jurisdiction.'3 6 Noting that pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine, the Court then examined the issue of whether the concepts of
pendent jurisdiction prevailed over the explicit limitations on federal jurisdiction contained in the eleventh amendment. 3 ' While
acknowledging that cases such as Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co. "' granted relief against state officers on the basis of
pendent state law claims, the Court minimized their precedential
value by maintaining that in none of those cases had the Court
even mentioned the eleventh amendment in connection with the
39
state law claim.
The Court concluded that the eleventh amendment is a specific
constitutional bar against hearing pendent claims that otherwise
would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.14° By ruling
that the judicially-created doctrine of pendent jurisdiction does not
override eleventh amendment immunity, the Court summarily disposed of the respondents' contentions that the application of the
eleventh amendment to pendent claims would result in bifurcated
claims against state officials and the adjudication of federal claims
in state courts. 4'' The majority insisted that such policy considerations must give way to the constitutional limitations on the federal
42
judiciary's authority to hear suits against a state.
The Pennhurst II majority also rejected the respondents' assertion that the judgment could be upheld against the petitioner
county officials. 1 3 The Court determined that, even assuming that
the county officials were not immune from suit challenging their
cluded any other interpretation, since governmental bodies need to be able to carry out
their functions free from direct judicial intervention.
135. Id. at 909 n.il, 914.
136. Id. at 917.
137. Id. at 917-18.
138. 213 U.S. 175 (1909). See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
139. PennhurstII, 104 S. Ct. at 917. The Court further diminished the significance of
those cases by asserting that they had proceeded on the erroneous assumption that once
jurisdiction was established on the basis of a federal question, no further eleventh amendment inquiry was necessary in regard to the other claims in the case. Id.
140. Id. at 918-19.
141. Id. at 919-20.
142. Id. at 920.
143. Id.
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actions under the MH/MR Act,' the present judgment could not
be sustained on the basis of state law obligations of the county officials.145 Finally, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the judgment could be sustained
on federal constitutional or statutory grounds. 146
The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, vigorously challenged each
aspect of the majority's analysis. He first noted that in the Court's
1982 Term, it had reaffirmed the principle that the eleventh
amendment does not bar an action against a state official based on
the theory that the officer acted in violation of a state statute. 47
He then proceeded to discuss earlier Court precedent which allowed injunctive relief grounded in state law against state officers.
Justice Stevens maintained that by the early twentieth century, it
was settled that the tortious conduct of state officers did not fall
under the protective scope of the eleventh amendment,'48 and that
the principles underlying the cases based on common law were also
held applicable to claims that state officers had violated state
49
statutes. 1'
The dissent also challenged the majority's position that the ra144. Id. The Court referred to earlier decisions which held that the eleventh amendment does not apply to counties and similar municipal entities. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S.
529, 530 (1890). However, the majority also noted that the Court has applied the amendment to bar relief against county officials in order to protect the state treasury from liability that would be tantamount to a judgment against the state itself. Pennhurst 11, 104 S.
Ct. at 900, 920 n.34, quoting Lake County Estates Inc., v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979). See also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
145. Pennhurst I1, 104 S. Ct. at 921. The Court reasoned that any relief granted
against the county officials would be "partial and incomplete at best," because funding for
the county mental retardation programs was derived almost entirely from the state. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 924 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 689 (1982). See also Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982). See also
supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
148. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 925 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cited, in
support of his position, Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 390-91
(1894); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 287 (1885); Cunningham v. Macon &
Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 452 (1883). See also supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
149. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 926-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Johnson v.
Lankford, 245 U.S. 541, 545 (1918) (action not barred because it alleged conduct in violation of state law); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R., 244 U.S. 499 (1917) (eleventh
amendment did not bar injunctive relief on the basis of state law); Scully v. Bird, 209 U.S.
481, 490 (1908) (suit to restrain a state officer from improperly enforcing a state statute
was not an action against the state); Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390,
411 (1887) (Court rejected the argument that a suit to enjoin a state officer to comply
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tionale of Ex parte Young 5 ' is limited to cases in which relief is
provided on the basis of federal law.'' Justice Stevens believed
instead that the critical element in Young was that the conduct at
issue was not the conduct of the sovereign.'1 2 In the dissent's view,
unconstitutional conduct such as that in Young renders the state
officer's activity "simply an illegal act"' 53 and thus not deserving of
the sovereign's immunity. 5 4 Justice Stevens concluded that it is
the distinction between the state and its officers, rather than any
notion of federal supremacy, which is embodied in both the doctrine of sovereign immunity and in the eleventh amendment.'5 5
In Justice Stevens' view, Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.156 further demonstrated that the sovereign immunity
doctrine did not apply here.' 57 Justice Stevens read Larson as
standing for the proposition that a violation of the law by a state
officer renders his conduct ultra vires, making him liable under the
law of agency.' 58 He believed that when a state has set specific
limitations on the manner in which state officials are to carry out
their duties, it must be determined whether the officials acted in a
manner that is forbidden by state law. 159 Since a sovereign would
not authorize its officers to violate its own law, Justice Stevens reasoned that an official who does so is acting ultra vires under Lar160
son, and therefore loses the protection of sovereign immunity.
In contrast to the majority, Justice Stevens agreed with the district
court and with the Third Circuit, and concluded that the petitioners operated Pennhurst in a manner forbidden by the state.' 6 '
Justice Stevens concluded that the eleventh amendment did not
prohibit suits against state officers based on conduct not allowed
under the state's own law.' 62 Such a suit is one against the officer,
with state law violated the eleventh amendment). See supra notes 40, 50-51 and accompanying text.
150. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
151. Pennhurst H, 104 S. Ct. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 933 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Young, 209 U.S. at 159.
154. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 933 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 935 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. 337 U.S. 682 (1949). See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text for discussion of Larson.
157. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 936 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 938 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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not the state. 163 Justice Stevens believed the controlling principle
was that the eleventh amendment is inapplicable in the absence of
a state law shield.' 64
Justice Stevens also sharply disagreed with the Court's rejection
of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine. 165 He maintained that the
Court had upheld injunctive relief on state law grounds in suits
against state officers where both federal constitutional questions
and issues of state law were presented. 1 6 6 According to Justice Stevens, applying the rule of Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co. 167 would actually enhance state sovereignty, since the federal
court would first address state law, which can be later modified or
repealed by the state. 168 He believed that the majority's position
"prevented federal courts from implementing State policies
169
through the equitable enforcement of State law."'
Justice Brennan dissented separately. 70 He fully agreed with
Justice Stevens' position that the petitioners' conduct was prohibited by state law.'' However, Justice Brennan expressed his longheld belief that the eleventh amendment only bars federal suits
brought by citizens of other states. 1 72 Since all of the parties in
163. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the Pennhurst II
decision overruled Siler and its progeny. Id. at 943 n.52. See supra notes 82-96 and
accompanying text for a discussion of pendent jurisdiction.
166. Pennhurst H, 104 S. Ct. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens relied
upon the following cases: Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415, 425 (1934); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177, 178 (1933); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478, 482-85 (1922); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U.S. 522, 527 (1917); Greene v. Louisville &
Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 508, 512-14 (1917).
167. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
168. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The dissent's view that Siler enhances state interests was shared by the federal government. The Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice filed a brief
in support of the Third Circuit's decision. Brief for the United States, Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). The government's position was
that neither the eleventh amendment nor the doctrines of sovereign immunity, comity, or
federalism warranted repudiation of the Siler doctrine.
169. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 922 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 921 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U.S.
983, 984 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the states may not raise the eleventh amendment defense when sued by their own citizens, since "that Amendment bars federal court
suits against States only by citizens of other States"); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
687-88 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (in suit brought by Illinois citizens against Illinois
officials, "Illinois may not invoke the Eleventh Amendment, since that Amendment bars
only federal court suits against States by citizens of other States"); Employees v. Missouri
Pub. Health & Welfare Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 320 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("except
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Pennhurst II were citizens of Pennsylvania, Justice Brennan concluded that the petitioners were not entitled to invoke the amendment's protection.173
ANALYSIS OF PENNHURST II

In reaching its decision in the PennhurstII case, the Court discussed several important jurisdictional doctrines that have been
used in the area of sovereign immunity and federal jurisdiction.
The Court addressed the pendent jurisdiction doctrine and the concept of ultra vires action. The Court also placed significant reliance upon the principle of federalism, recognizing the need to
accommodate federal power to the states' constitutional
immunity. 174

Despite the Court's recognition of the need to balance federal
and state concerns, it is questionable whether the Pennhurst II
holding actually promotes federalism. For example, where injunctive relief is sought on both federal constitutional and state
grounds, under PennhurstII a federal court will have to adjudicate
the federal issue without reaching the state claim. This process
may result in numerous constitutionally based decisions, which
would be a departure from the established practice of basing most
such decisions on state law grounds. 175 Moreover, a district court
order based on federal law renders state authorities powerless to
alter the ground of the decision.176 A state court or legislature dissatisfied with a district court's interpretation of state law can
change that law through judicial decree or legislation; state judges
and lawmakers, however, are not similarly free to modify a decision based on federal constitutional law.
Justice Stevens' position reflected a more accurate view of federalism concerns. He contended that Court precedent favored the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, rather than the text of the amendas the Eleventh Amendment may be read to create a jurisdictional bar against suits by
citizens of another State or by aliens, the restriction on the exercise of federal judicial
power in suits against a State brought by individuals derives ... from traditional nonconstitutional principles of sovereign immunity.").
173. Pennhurst 11, 104 S.Ct. at 921 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S.Ct. 900, 910 (1984). The
Court indicated that "Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive relief
fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to an
important degree the constitutional immunity of the States." Id. at 911.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88. There is also the possibility, however,
that some decisions will be based on federal statutory, rather than constitutional,
grounds.
176. Pennhurst H, 104 S.Ct. at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ment itself, in interpreting the scope of eleventh amendment immunity. 77
' This emphasis upon immunity principles promotes respect
for the sovereign, yet, at the same time, correctly denies a sovereign immunity defense to an official who violates the sovereign's
law. Accordingly, leaving state law violations unredressed is arguably incompatible with the concept of sovereign immunity.' 78 A
federal court's equitable enforcement of state law acknowledges the
state's sovereignty and the need to comply with state law.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions considered the impact
of federal injunctive relief upon the states. In the majority's view, a
federal injunction directed at state officials and based on state law
was a tremendous infringement upon state sovereignty. 79 However, the Court failed to acknowledge that federal courts have routinely enjoined state officials on federal grounds."8 ° One such
category of cases is the school desegregation litigation of the past
three decades. Such suits have had a highly significant impact on
state officials, even though based upon the fourteenth
amendment.' 8
Justice Stevens' dissenting position was that a federally based
injunction affects a state in the same way as an injunction
grounded in state law.' 8 2 This view is arguably the more accurate
one, since the PennhurstII Court artificially distinguished between
state and federally based injunctions. For example, a state's compliance with any injunction, whether based on state or federal
grounds, may require substantial expenditures.' 83 The reality is
177. Id. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also supra note 22 and accompanying
text, and note 36 and accompanying text.
178. 104 S.Ct. at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Id.at 911.
180. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 45, at § 4231. According to Professors Wright and Miller, in earlier years Young was the foundation from which state utility regulation and welfare legislation were attacked. More recently, the Young doctrine
has provided the basis for forcing schools to desegregate. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
181. Id. See, e.g., Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218
(1964) (Court rejected defendants' eleventh amendment defense and concluded that suits
against state and county officials to enjoin them from invading constitutional rights are
not forbidden by the amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1954)
(cases in school desegregation litigation remanded so that district courts could enter such
orders and decrees as were necessary and proper to admit the parties to public schools on
a racially nondiscriminatory basis).
182. Pennhurst 11, 104 S.Ct. at 935 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens contended that the Pennhurst II majority recognized that injunctions sanctioned by Young
had an "obvious impact on the State itself." Id. See also id. at 910.
183. Cf Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974) (Court noted that "the fiscal
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that either type of injunction intrudes equally upon state authority
because state officials are ordered to act in a particular manner.
The majority and dissenting opinions engaged in markedly different analyses of the Ex parte Young decision,184 which had permitted a federal court to enjoin a state official from enforcing an
unconstitutional state statute. 185 In the majority's view, Young's
significance was that it enabled the federal judiciary to vindicate
federally created rights and to hold state officers accountable to
federal law.186 However, Justice Stevens maintained that the vindication of federal rights was not the critical element in Young. 8 7 He
believed that Young established that unconstitutional conduct by
state officers is not state action "because the federal Constitution
strikes down the state law shield."'8 8 Thus, Justice Stevens reasoned that when a state officer violates a state law, the officer loses
the protective state law shield. 18 9
In concluding that Young did not apply to the present case, the
majority adopted the widely accepted view that the Young doctrine
protects federal constitutional rights.1 90 Justice Stevens, however,
concluded that the suit was not barred by the eleventh amendment,
since it alleged conduct violative of state law.1 91 Although Justice
Stevens offered a less traditional interpretation of Young, the analysis is consistent with his emphasis upon the distinction between the
sovereign and its officers. 192
In refusing to uphold the court of appeals' decision based on
state law, the Pennhurst II Court rejected as an independent
ground of decision the pendent jurisdiction doctrine, which allows
a court to decide related claims over which it would not otherwise
consequences to state treasuries in . . . [some earlier Court] cases were the necessary
result of compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature.").
184. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
185. Id. at 159-60.
186. Pennhurst H, 104 S. Ct. at 910.
187. Id. at 932 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens maintained that some of
Young's predecessors supported his view. Id. at 933-34. For example, in Poindexter v.
Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884), the Court held that a suit challenging an unconstitutional attempt by the Virginia legislature to disavow a state contract was not barred by
the eleventh amendment. The Poindexter Court treated the federal Constitution as part
of the law of Virginia and determined that the challenged action was not that of Virginia
because it violated Virginia's law. 114 U.S. at 292-93.
188. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). As further support for this view, Justice Stevens
indicated that in tort cases, there is no state-law defense to protect a defendant state
official against a successful plaintiff.
190. Id. at 911. See also infra text accompanying note 210.
191. Id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 155, 162-64.
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have jurisdiction. 193 The majority reasoned that since Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. 194 and its progeny had not addressed the eleventh amendment in connection with the state law
claims, those cases were not dispositive of the case at bar.' 9 The
majority determined that the eleventh amendment was a specific
constitutional bar applicable to pendent claims against state officials.196 Arguably, however, Justice Stevens was correct in his position that the Siler principle, which emphasizes the avoidance of
97
unnecessary federal constitutional decisions, was controlling.
The majority did not adequately address the fact that its prior
decision in PennhurstI had remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine if the district court's remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or the Federal
Rehabilitation Act. 98 The majority failed to acknowledge that, in
reaching a decision based upon state law, the court of appeals did
exactly what the Pennhurst I Court had instructed it to do. The
Pennhurst II Court was certainly entitled to address the eleventh
amendment and pendent jurisdiction issues, but it should have at
least acknowledged the apparent contradiction of its current decision with its prior remand order.
The majority rejected the respondents' ultra vires argument in
concluding that the petitioners' actions in operating Pennhurst
were within the scope of their delegated authority.199 One fundamental problem with the majority's opinion was that the Court's
ultra vires inquiry does not necessarily provide firm guidance for
future courts. No distinction is drawn between action which is an
error of law, but within the scope of authority, and conduct which
is beyond that scope, and therefore forbidden. The Court's empha193. See supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
194. 213 U.S. 175 (1909). See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
195. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 917-18.
196. Id. at 919.
197. Id. at 940-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The court of appeals made the following observations about Siler:
Siler is generally regarded as the seminal case on pendent jurisdiction. For
our purposes its greatest significance is that it presented the identical problem
before us: a case against state officers over which the federal court had federal
question jurisdiction, despite the Eleventh Amendment, because of the holding
in Ex Parte Young. Since the pendent jurisdiction rule originated in a case involving state officers, there cannot be, as the Commonwealth suggests, an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule.
Pennhurst, 673 F.2d 647, 658 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc).
198. See Pennhurst 1, 451 U.S. 1, 31 (1981).
199. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. 900, 909 n. 11 (1984). See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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sis of the concept of action undertaken "without any authority
whatever," as opposed to conduct which is an error in the exercise
of delegated power, does not help to clarify the appropriate legal
guidelines.2°° This lack of definition could be particularly problematic in situations, unlike Pennhurst II, where detailed statutory or
administrative guidelines are lacking.
Conceivably, the majority's rationale allows a district court to
circumvent Pennhurst II by finding that a particular official acted
totally without authority and was therefore not shielded by the
state's sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit, for example, recently recognized this possibility in Miami University Associated
Student Government v. Shriver.2 0 ' In that case, the plaintiff argued
that the defendant Board of Trustees lacked the authority to enforce a campus policy.2"2 The court concluded that if, on remand,
the judge accepted the proposition that the defendant had acted
without any authority whatever, then Pennhurst11 would not prevent the judge from ordering the defendant to conform its conduct
to Ohio law.2°3 As evidenced by Shriver, federal courts may undoubtedly interpret the ultra vires concept in varying fashions. A
suit may be considered not to be against the state, and therefore
not barred by the eleventh amendment, if a plaintiff can establish
that the defendant state official acted totally without statutory
authority.
Pennhurst II clearly broadens the scope of state immunity from
federal suits seeking injunctive relief by expanding the category of
state officials able to claim eleventh amendment protection. This
expansion of immunity, however, does not appear to parallel recent
developments in the law of state sovereign immunity. 2" Most
200. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. 900, 909 n. 11.
201. 735 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1984). At issue in Shriver was Miami University's
"no-car" policy for undergraduate students. The rule provided that unless a student fit
into one of several exceptions, he or she could not operate an automobile on the university campus or in the surrounding town of Oxford, Ohio.
202. Id. at 203. The Association challenged the Board of Trustees' "no-car" policy
on the following grounds: (1) it alleged that the policy violated its members' associational, travel, and privacy rights under the fourteenth amendment, and (2) it alleged that
the Board of Trustees lacked the authority under state law to establish and enforce rules
of conduct unrelated to academic performance off of the college campus.
203. Id. at 204.
204. One must keep in mind that state sovereign immunity is different than eleventh
amendment immunity, since the eleventh amendment only deals with suing the state in a
federal court. Cf Florida Dep't. of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing
Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1981) (per curiam) (waiver of sovereign immunity for
state agency did not constitute waiver of eleventh amendment immunity); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 n.19 (1974) (Court determined that whether the State of Illinois permitted suit to be brought against it in its own courts was not determinative of
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states have already abolished complete sovereign immunity in the
tort area,2 0° and several have abolished the sovereign immunity defense in contract cases.2" 6 These trends represent a divergence
from Pennhurst Irs strong affirmation of state sovereignty. The
Supreme Court seems quite willing to struggle to preserve a concept that the states themselves are abandoning.
LITIGATION AFTER PENNHURST II

In addition to its theoretical and academic interest, the Pennhurst II decision will undoubtedly have a very significant and practical effect on litigation in the federal courts.2 °7 The decision
severely restricts the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, since it precludes injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of state
law. Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief against such officials must
respond to these new limitations.
PennhurstII will probably affect both the types of claims alleged
and the choice of forums. If a federal forum is desired, plaintiffs
suing state officials will have to forego their state law claims and
sue in federal court by alleging only a federal constitutional or statutory violation. This is likely to increase the number of decisions
based on federal constitutional grounds, an outcome decried by the
Court in Siler v. Lousiville & Nashville Railroad Co. 20 8 Alternatively, litigants may choose to bring suits in state courts, in order to
allege both state and federal claims. This result is unsatisfactory,
since it undercuts Ex parte Young'S2 0 9 premise that federal court
jurisdiction protects
constitutional rights against invasion at the
trial court level.21 °
whether Illinois had relinquished its eleventh amendment immunity from suit in federal
courts). However, it is of interest to consider developments in the state sovereign immunity area.
205. See 1 DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 20.03.50 (1982 and Supp. 1984).
As an example of state courts abrogating the sovereign immunity defense, see
Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc., 2 Ohio St. 2d 26, 442 N.E.2d 749 (1982) (court in
nuisance action ruled that in absence of a specific statute, the defense of sovereign immunity was no longer available to municipalities).
206. See Frank, Suing the State, 70 A.B.A. J., June, 1984, at 35. See also Pan-Am
Tobacco Corp. v. Florida, No. 63,215 slip op. (Fla. March 1, 1984).
207. See generally English, The Pennhurst II Decision and Its Implicationsfor Foster
Care Litigation, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 33 (1984); Turner, Federal Jurisdictionafter

Pennhurst, 4 CAL. LAW., Sept. 1984, at 10. Turner states that Pennsylvania officials
decided to close Pennhurst by July 1, 1986. This decision was made before the court of
appeals could act on the Supreme Court remand order. Turner, supra, at 12.
208. 213 U.S. 175 (1909). See supra text accompanying note 88.
209. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
210. See Baker, supra note 2, at 158.
Yet another alternative is for a plaintiff to sue first in state court on the basis of state
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The PennhurstII rationale also ignores the fact that judges are
elected in many states. Regardless of the basis of an injunction,
some judges will be reluctant to take the politically controversial
position of enjoining their own state officials. Other consequences
are possible at the state court level. For example, state judges may
ultimately develop further expertise in certain areas of federal constitutional law. 211 They may also choose to expansively interpret
the provisions of their own state's constitution, in order to accomrmodate the rights and remedies that would otherwise be provided
under provisions of the federal Constitution. These positive
changes could result in more thorough adjudication of federal and
state constitutional issues by the state courts.
Another consideration affecting the states is that if the number
of ultra vires challenges against state officials substantially increases, state legislatures may be prompted to statutorily broaden
the discretion of state administrative officials, in order to avoid
such challenges under PennhurstI's expansive holding. Some degree of official discretion is necessary and desirable, but lawmakers
law claims, or in a federal court on federal claims, and then later sue in the other forum if
he or she obtained inadequate relief in the first forum. However, this approach may run
afoul of the res judicata doctrine. See generally Note, The Res Judicata Implications of
Pendent Jurisdiction, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1981); Comment, Res Judicataand Section 1983: The Effects of State Court Judgments on Federal Civil Rights Actions, 27
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 177 (1979); Note, The Res JudicataEffect ofFederalDeclaratoryJudgments in State Proceedings, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 754 (1979).
In assessing the possible effect of the Pennhurst I holding on the abstention doctrine, it
appears that Pennhurst II will not directly affect the continued viability of Pullman-type
abstention. The Pullman doctrine generally calls for a federal court to postpone decision
of a case which presents constitutional issues, if resolution of those constitutional issues
might be avoided by a state court decision of an unsettled state law question. See Ryckman, Land Use Litigation, Federal Jurisdiction,and the Abstention Doctrines, 69 CALIF.
L. REV. 377, 396 (1981). In contrast, the Pennhurst II plaintiffs did not challenge the
MH/MR Act on federal constitutional grounds. In holding that the eleventh amendment
barred the state law claims, the Pennhurst II Court did not address the issue of the lower
federal court retaining jurisdiction over those claims, as a federal court would do under
Pullman abstention.
It should be noted there is a distinct difference between pendent jurisdiction and abstention, even though both doctrines are based in part on the principle that unsettled state
law issues should be decided by state courts. See Gary B. v. Cronin, 542 F. Supp. 102,
115 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (court indicated that "when a federal court abstains, it is declining to
decide federal claims because of the state law issues, whereas when the court refuses to
exercise pendent jurisdiction, it is merely declining to resolve the state law claims").
211. Some state judges, especially those hearing criminal cases, are highly experienced in adjudicating constitutional claims. See generally O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between Federal and State Courtsfrom the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22
WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 802-06 (1981).

For an interesting discussion of the role of state courts in elaborating federal constitutional principles, see Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22
WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981).
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will face the troublesome task of making sure that state officials are
not given unbridled discretion, since that could raise issues of improper delegation of legislative authority.21 2
The Pennhurst II decision can only add to the debate over the
proper balance of power in our dual system of federal and state
government. Recent proposals to limit federal jurisdiction over
controversial issues,21 3 the proposals to abolish diversity jurisdiction, 21 4 and the growing use of state constitutions to protect fundamental constitutional rights 215 suggest a major shift in federal and
state relations.216 Clearly, comprehensive eleventh amendment
analysis after Pennhurst I must continue to take into account the
consideration of federalism underlying all aspects of the
amendment.
CONCLUSION

In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, the
Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a federal court could
enjoin state officials on the basis of state law. A bare majority upheld the petitioners' eleventh amendment defense, and placed a significant limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
adjudicate lawsuits seeking injunctions against state officers and
agencies. The Pennhurst II majority viewed the eleventh amendment as establishing a constitutional sovereign immunity and con212. If inadequate guidelines exist within a law to guide exercises of administrative
discretion, courts may invalidate actions pursuant to such laws, on the basis that the
officials usurped legislative authority. See Bio-Medical Laboratories, v. Trainor, 68 Ill.
2d 540, 551, 370 N.E.2d 223, 228 (1977) (a delegation of discretionary authority to an
administrative officer must be accompanied by intelligible standards to guide him).
213. See generally Gressman & Gressman, Necessary and Proper Roots of Exceptions
to FederalJurisdiction, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495 (1983), for discussion of recurring
attempts to eviscerate the "arising under" jurisdiction of the federal courts. The authors
list a number of current bills pending in Congress which would limit or remove various
aspects of federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 497 n.6. See also Symposium: Congressional
Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction,27 VILL. L. REV. 893 (1982).
214. See, e.g., Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231,
236-37 (1976); Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction:Positive Side Effects and Potential
for FurtherReforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1979). See also S. 2389, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 28, 30-33 (1978) (abolishing diversity jurisdiction except for alienage and statutory interpleader); H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 49925000 (1978); S. REP. No. 691, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930).
215. See Developments in the Law-The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982).
216. See Goetsch, Introduction to Connecticut Law Survey, 56 CONN. B.J. 186, 18687 (1982); also, see the Reagan Administration's "New Federalism" proposals, discussed
in McGowan, Federalism-Old and New-and the Federal Courts, 70 GEO. L.J. 1421
(1982).
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sidered a federal injunction directed against state officials, based on
state law, as the ultimate intrusion on state autonomy. In addition,
the Court expansively interpreted the ultra vires language from
past decisions and provided immunity for state officials who act
within their nominal authority, but in violation of state law. Finally, the Pennhurst H Court repudiated a well-respected line of
cases which had called for cases to be adjudicated upon the narrowest bases possible and for the avoidance of unnecessary decisions of constitutional questions. What the Court failed to do was
to realize that its holding does not actually serve the principles of
federalism that it allegedly promotes, since it prevents federal
courts from equitably enforcing state law.
At a practical level, Pennhurst H will interfere with a plaintiff's
right to seek injunctive relief against state officials, by forcing a
litigant to either pursue a federal remedy and forego allegations of
state law violations, or to opt for state court adjudication of both
federal and state claims. Although there may be some positive impact upon the state judiciaries in the future, it may have been
achieved at too high a price. The PennhurstH decision is a step
backward for advocates of federal judicial activism, and for those
who maintain that eleventh amendment immunity should not be
available to state officials who act in a manner forbidden by their
own state governments.
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